Shifting baselines of happiness

I’ve just read a fascinating piece on happiness by the evolutionary ecologist Hanna Kokko, in the latest issue of the British Ecological Society’s Bulletin. Hanna was reporting her impressions of a multidisciplinary happiness conference, Is more always better?, at which she had been the only ecologist. Now, I’ve been sort of vaguely aware of this kind of research for a while, things like the pervasive role of income disparity, rather than income per se_, in determining how happy we are; the fact that happiness only correlates with wealth up to a (rather low) threshold (i.e., once you can afford food and shelter, additional wealth has little impact on (average) happiness levels); and that partly this is due to the fact that, as Hanna quotes neuroscientist Morten Kringelbach, money ‘never evokes satiety’ in the brain – no-one ever feels like they have enough (hence the prevalence of tax-dodging among the super rich, no doubt). (Most of my previous understanding, by the way, derives from Clive Hamilton’s excellent and thought-provoking Growth Fetishfetish, which questions the predominance of growth in GDP as the single underlying policy of most modern political parties.)

But what intrigued me particularly in Hanna’s article was the reference to the role of ecology, or perhaps more specifically ‘nature’ (with a small ‘n’, note!), in making us happy. Things like birdsong, green space, clean rivers, ancient trees all make us happy (most of us, anyway) in ways that probably don’t need to be quantified, but can be nonetheless. A big new initiative in the UK, the Valuing Nature Network, is trying to do just that, so that nature’s value can be properly entered into future planning and development discussions.

The corollary of us valuing nature is that losing nature generally reduces the sum of human happiness. The uncomfortable question that Hanna raises is, Yes, but for how long?

Some years ago in Beijing it struck me how many millions of its inhabitants go on about their daily lives without having much of the chance to hear birds sing… They did not seem to wake up utterly devastated by this every morning… Humans appear pretty resilient, thus when we’re trying to protect charismatic species for the delight of future generations, how should we react to the news that they will be relatively indifferent to our failures?… Of course we’d all prefer that the dodo still existed, but on a daily basis, none of us is actively outraged by its extinction.

In other words, the baseline of what we consider acceptable shifts, certainly over generations, but also perhaps even within a generation. I mentioned Daniel Pauly’s work on shifting baselines in an earlier post, in a fisheries context, and there are lots of interesting case studies. For example, when quizzed by researchers, older Mexican artisinal fishermen were far more pessimistic about the state of fishing grounds than were their sons and grandsons (and the questions were structured in such a way to avoid ‘grumpy old man’ artefacts!). And for a terrestrial example, think how different life would have been in those parts of North America overflown by 300-mile long flocks of passenger pigeons. But that folk memory has gone.

Closer to (my) home, how many visitors to the North Yorkshire seaside resort of Scarborough leave disappointed that they were not able to go sport fishing for bluefin tuna during their week’s holiday? And yet, less than a century ago, this used to happen.

So what’s to be done? Should we just append Joni Mitchell’s You don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone with ‘(and then after a while, you forget about it anyway)’? Well, maybe. But I strongly believe that one of the things we should be doing as ecologists (in collaboration with historians, visual artists, virtual reality experts, whoever it takes) is to be recreating a view of nature that is gone, but attainable; to draw some lines in the sand, to fix at least some baselines; to create a collective imaginative vision of what nature could be, and so to inspire people to conserve and restore what we have left.

One for the geeks...

The annual confluence of bank holiday, a rampant garden, and exam marking has seriously curtailed blogging time for now, but I feel compelled to share this fabulous emporium of all things statsy-mathsy-geeky with you. You want cushions of all your favourite statistical distributions?
stats cushions.jpg
Check.

You want statistics propaganda posters?
stats propaganda.jpg
Check.

And all manner of other charming products, from prime number quilts to cross-stitch patterns.

OK, so importing this stuff to the UK is a bit pricey. But I wouldn’t bet against seeing Mola mola Jr. sporting this sometime later this summer…
stats baby.jpg

Evidence in Science and Policy

Ben Godacre’s Bad Science column has recently been moved to the inside back page of the Saturday Guardian, which means I read it over breakfast (like most people with a passing interest in sport, and old enough still to read news on paper, I always read newspapers back to front, even when the sport is in a separate section…). Last week, he wrote about the dearth of evidence in politics. Specifically, on the resistance to actually finding out – collecting and analysing evidence, in other words – if policies do what they were intended to. I couldn’t agree more, and it’s an issue that has been frustrating me for a while. Those of us involved in environmental science (and I suspect it’s the same in other areas) are constantly bombarded with calls to feed in to the ‘evidence-based policy’ process. Now, basing policy on evidence seems to me a very good idea (although I suspect that ‘evidence-based policy’ is usually just a stalling mechanism – a way to avoid making difficult decisions by constantly calling for more evidence before acting), and one result of this push is that the evidence base for phenomena like climate change, biodiversity loss, etc., is fast becoming exceptional.

But I’ve often felt that whereas ‘scientific’ policy is held up to very high standards of evidence, the same is not the case for ‘social’ policy (nor economic policy either, which may be the subject of a future blog…)

Rather, when considering which policy to advocate, politicians seem as likely to be swayed by a snappily-titled book than by any substantive body of evidence. A title like Blink (‘the power of thinking without thinking’), Nudge (‘improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness’), and Sneeze (‘harnessing the creative power of hayfever’) is ideal (OK, so I may have made one of those up), wherein a (sometimes good) idea is stretched well beyond its limits, and a hodge-podge of facts are crammed into this shaky framework. The Big Society beloved of Mr Cameron falls into this category: a scheme which nobody has tested, but on which basis incredibly important decisions are now being made. (For my money, the ‘big’ is redundant anyway, all that’s being described is what we used to call society (when such a thing still existed…).)

So, yes, Ben Goldacre is absolutely right: let’s get evidence into the policy process, and put some numbers behind big decisions (such as the voting system). If, say, we make wholesale changes to the NHS, triple university tuition fees, or whatever, we must carefully record the outcome of this intervention so that in years to come, we have a fighting chance of deciding whether or not it succeeded.

Where I depart slightly Goldacre is in how we do this. He (like most medics) is a firm believer in the randomised controlled trial, a tremendously powerful way to assess the efficacy of a medical procedure. In some cases, it may be feasible to perform analogous trials in social policy, but this will rarely be the case – you can’t, for instance, change the whole governance structure of one hospital in a region without changing others; and if you then end up comparing regions, the randomising is lost, as regions will differ in a series of other metrics.

I should add that Goldacre’s column is predicated on two books about randomised trials in social policy, which I haven’t yet read. My scepticism is derived more from my experience in applied ecology, where there has been a move recently to adopt medical methods – specifically, systematic reviews – to assess the outcome of conservation interventions. The problem is, ecosystem manipulations are not clinical trials. Often, there is no standard intervention, and even if there is, it may be applied to very different systems (differing in species composition, and all kinds of physical characteristcs, not least spatial extent). And often too, there is no agreed-upon outcome – I could increase the species richness in my garden, for instance (at least for a while) by introducing Japanese knotweed, but few would argue that that would be a ‘good’ conservation outcome. In medicine, you treat a patient, and they get better or they don’t, making comparisons between trials much more straightforward.

The solutions that environmental scientists have come up with generally are highly sophisticated statistical methods, allowing us to draw powerful inference from nasty, heterogeneous data. Similar methods have of course been applied to social systems, but somehow they don’t seem to feed through to policy, at least not as often as they should; and even when they do, they risk being ignored if their message is politically undesirable .

To return to the original point, improving social and environmental policy requires that we know what has worked, and what has not, in the past and elsewhere. So solving this evidence problem (i.e. gathering it, and communicating it) should be top priority for both natural and social sciences.